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Motivated by  the recent findings of marked secular increases in corporate debt       
in developed economies, we examine the dynamics and determinants of corporate 
debt in South Africa using a large sample of 775 listed firms. We report an 89% 
increase in gearing of the average firm, from 11% in 1990 to 21% in 2015. Long- 
term and short-term debt increased by 103% and 67%, respectively. We find that  
this increase is pervasive and cannot be explained entirely by either firm attributes  
or macroeconomic factors,  in spite of the importance of the latter.  Instead,  we   
find supply-side factors to be the main determinants of the upward trend in cor- 
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Corporate financing decisions are essential components of corporate strategy that can de- 
termine the success or failure of a firm, especially during periods of significant contractions 
in credit supply. Using more debt can maximise a firm’s value, but can also inadvertently 
lead to bankruptcy in economic downturns (Campello et al., 2010; Campello and Gi- 
ambona, 2013; Kahle and Stulz, 2013; Garay et al., 2019). Recent research on developed 
economies documents a marked secular increase in corporate debt (ratio of total debt to 
total assets). Graham et al. (2015), for example, attribute the four-fold increase in USA 
corporate debt from 11% in 1945 to 47% in the 1990s to the rise in macroeconomic un- 
certainty, public debt, and financial development. Campello et al. (2010), Campello and 
Giambona (2013) and Kahle and Stulz (2013) report a marked surge in corporate debt 
before the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007/2008. Also, Custdio et al. 
(2013) document significant changes in debt composition as debt maturity continues to 
decrease in the USA. They attribute this to an influx of young firms with high information 
asymmetry and limited access to long-term financing. Beside these significant findings in 
the USA, little is known about the dynamics of corporate debt in emerging markets that 
are beleaguered with inadequate institutional frameworks. 
Emerging markets provide interesting research settings since the weak institutional 
structures and the low levels of capital market development create greater challenges in 
accessing external sources of financing. While it is easier for firms in developed countries 
to raise external finance due to institutional openness and higher levels and quality of 
information disclosure, firms in emerging markets face difficulties because of high levels of 
information asymmetry and weak regulatory frameworks that inadequately discourage or 
restrict adverse practices such as corruption (Areneke and Kimani, 2019). Accordingly, 
the trends and determinants of corporate debt in emerging economies may be dissimilar to 
those reported on more developed capital markets (see Custdio et al., 2013; Graham et al., 
2015). We conjecture that the rising corporate debt levels and their determinants, as re- 
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ported on developed economies, may not be entirely generalisable to emerging economies 
that have markedly different financial infrastructures, degrees of institutional openness, 
and levels of capital market development. 
We test this conjecture and fill the associated research gap by investigating the evolu- 
tion and determinants of corporate debt in South Africa over the period 1990–2015. The 
choice of South Africa is motivated by two main factors that make the context utilitarian 
as an exemplary emerging economy. First, South Africa has the largest, most developed, 
and best-regulated stock market in Africa (You et al., 2019). This makes it the continent’s 
financial hub South of the Sahara, and the destination of choice for foreign and regional 
banks, who are the main suppliers of firm credit. Further, unlike other African countries, 
it has a high level of institutional shareholding and well-diversified ownership and financ- 
ing sources, of which debt is most prominent (Hearn et al., 2010). Second, relative to 
other emerging economies, South Africa’s economic and political history has interesting 
similarities as well as differences that make it an ideal case for examining whether macroe- 
conomic and supply-side factors influence corporate financing decisions. Specifically, the 
country has experienced two distinct political and economic phases (which we include in 
our sample period). The first phase is from 1990 to 1995 during which the country was 
isolated due to sanctions imposed by international organisations for practising apartheid 
(Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Throughout this period, the government regulated fi- 
nancial transactions in assets by requiring most payments be made by domestic equity 
investments rather than by money-market or bond-market instruments (Kapingura and 
Makhetha-Kosi, 2014). The second phase began after the abolition of apartheid in 1995, 
which led to financial liberalisation that included the acceptance of foreign investments 
and the subsequent growth of the bond market (Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak, 2009; 
Kapingura and Makhetha-Kosi, 2014). As a result, South Africa has risen as an ‘emerg- 
ing economy’ that bolsters one of the most developed bond markets in the continent. In 
2012, it had the highest level of corporate and sovereign debt amongst African countries 
(Mecagni et al., 2014). It also currently boasts one of the most sophisticated and robust 
4  
corporate governance systems in emerging economies, comparable only to the UK and 
the USA. According to Ntim et al. (2012), South African practice is an exemplification 
of how corporate governance practices can be customised to meet institutional realities 
in emerging markets. The South African government has also implemented a corpo- 
rate governance code (The King Report), and revised it several times, to boost investor 
confidence in both the local equity and bond markets. This mix makes South Africa a 
particularly interesting case to study. 
 
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
 
We report some comparative statistics to further buttress both the appropriateness 
and the distinctiveness of the South African context. Figure 1 plots average stock market 
capitalisation (Graph 1a) and private credit (Graph 1b) as ratios to GDP for South 
Africa, USA, UK, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and the ‘World’.1 Graph 1a shows that 
the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP for South Africa is rising faster than in 
other countries. Graph 1b shows that the ratio of private credit to GDP is tracking that 
of the USA, often higher than that of the UK, and is substantially higher than that of 
Sub-Saharan African countries. Further, with the highest global investment flow, South 
Africa is compared to the BRICs (Mensi et al., 2014; You et al., 2019). This combination 
makes the country a channel through which global economic shocks, such as the recent 
credit supply shock, can be transmitted to other emerging economies in general and to 
African economies in particular. 
Although these characteristics of South Africa have several important implications 
related to corporate financing decisions, to our knowledge, these implications have not 
yet been investigated. Against this background, we formulate and test three hypotheses 
linked to the following questions: How is corporate debt finance evolving? Do traditional 
demand-side determinants of corporate debt explain this evolution? If demand-side fac- 
1All amounts are denominated in USD. 
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tors do not explain the changes in corporate debt, what other factors could? These 
questions have not been examined in emerging markets. 
 
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
 
Before addressing these research questions, and by way of motivation, we present 
some observations. Graph 1a of Figure 2 plots the evolution of corporate debt over the 
sample period. It shows an increase of 89% in average total debt over the entire period. 
Interestingly, this increase coincides with a marked decrease in collateral (tangible assets, 
represented by property, plant and equipment, or PPE) and a significant rise in intangible 
assets and investments.2 This suggests that a high proportion of intangible assets, the 
difference between non-current assets and PPE, is being financed by debt, which further 
increases corporate risk. This is contrary to the theory of Krainer (2014), which posits 
that firms use capital structure to manage or counteract risk in investment portfolios.3 We 
analyse this further and find that changes in firm characteristics over the sample period 
do not explain the increase in corporate debt, since these characteristics have changed 
in a way that does not predict leveraging. For example, the downward trend of asset 
tangibility suggests that corporate debt capacity should be decreasing. Over the entire 
sample period, and on average without control variables, the basic statistics on overall 
trends in firm size and profitability are insignificantly different from zero. According to 
theory, this implies a prediction of neither leveraging nor deleveraging. Yet, we observe 
significant overall average leveraging. Simultaneously, other factors, such as Tobin’s q 
and non-debt tax shield, which are theoretically associated with low-debt financing, are 
increasing. These trends are surprising because they suggest that corporate debt should 
2Appendix E shows that intangible assets (INTANG), the difference between non-current assets and 
PPE, increased by 201% from a low of 7.2% in 1991 to a peak of 21.6% in 2015. Several other studies in 
developed economies report similar marked increases in intangible investments, or R&D, which theoret- 
ically should lead to a decrease in the usage of debt financing (see Brown and Petersen, 2011; Borisova 
and Brown, 2013; Brown et al., 2012; Falato et al., 2018; Manikas et al., 2019). 
3Dierker et al. (2013) also find that firms in the USA adjust capital structure to manage risk, which 
implies that firms in our sample should deleverage because the risky intangible assets and investments 
are increasing over time. 
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be decreasing instead of increasing as attested by the significant positive trends reported 
in Figure 2. Overall, the upward trend in corporate debt over the sample period does not 
initially seem to be explained by changes in firm-specific characteristics. 
Accordingly, the analysis will proceed by examining whether changes in macroeco- 
nomic conditions drive the dynamics in corporate debt (see Goyal et al., 2011; Custdio 
et al., 2013; Oztekin, 2015; Graham et al., 2015). The macroeconomic factors that we use 
are: foreign direct investment, total value of stocks traded, GDP growth, interest rate 
spread, real interest rate, inflation, and domestic credit. We find that macroeconomic 
factors are important determinants of corporate debt, but can only partially explain 
the increase in debt financing in South Africa as the trend in corporate debt remains 
significant even after accounting for these factors. Consequently, we examine whether 
supply-side factors, which are mostly overlooked in the literature, account for the resid- 
ual increase in corporate debt. We find that changes in the capital markets explain this 
residual trend in corporate debt. Our findings suggest that the trend in corporate debt 
is significantly higher in the pre-crisis periods and post-liberalisation of capital markets 
relative to the post-crisis and pre-liberalisation periods, respectively. This evidence high- 
lights the significant role of supply-side factors as emerging determinants of corporate 
debt. 
Our study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we deviate from prior 
studies in showing the importance of the understudied supply-side factors in explaining 
the rising corporate debt levels in an emerging market. Most prior studies focus on 
developed economies and limit the scope of the determinants of corporate debt to demand- 
side and macroeconomic factors (e.g. Dang, 2011; Custdio et al., 2013; Graham et al., 
2015). In doing so, they overlook supply-side factors as possible determinants of corporate 
debt and the uniqueness of emerging economies in terms of economic growth, financial and 
institutional structures, and institutional challenges to corporate practices. We advance 
the literature by showing that supply-side factors are major determinants of the rising 
corporate debt for firms operating in emerging economies (exemplified by the South 
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African context), where access to external capital is limited. Second, contrary to theory 
and the results reported on developed economies (see Leary and Roberts, 2010; Dang, 
2011; Oztekin, 2015), we find that demand-side factors (size, tangibility and profitability) 
are unable to explain the evolution of corporate debt in South Africa, as these factors are 
not changing in a way that would support the upward trend in corporate debt. Given 
the actual evolution of demand-side factors, theory predicts that firms should deleverage 
because their debt capacity is shrinking over time. Instead, we observe a strong increasing 
trend in leverage. Finally, we provide further evidence on the effects of macroeconomic 
conditions on rising corporate debt in emerging economies. We find macroeconomic 
factors to be important but can explain the rising corporate debt levels in South Africa 
only partially. This is not entirely consistent with the model of Chen (2010), which 
highlights macroeconomic conditions as the most important determinants of corporate 
dynamics in developed economies. The most likely reason for this discrepancy is the 
limited financing choices available to firms that operate in emerging economies. This 
emphasises supply-side factors as more relevant determinants of the rising corporate debt 
in these countries. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the theory and 
hypotheses, Section 3 discusses the methodology, Section 4 presents the data used in the 
analyses, Section 5 discusses the empirical results, Section 6 presents robustness tests, 
and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2 Theory and hypotheses 
 
Several studies in the USA report marked changes in the composition of firms as economies 
increasingly shift from manufacturing to technology and services sectors. For example, 
Fama and French (2001, 2004) attribute the increase in new equity issues and the decrease 
in dividends to an influx of young and less profitable firms. Lee et al. (2000) find that 
corporate debt dynamics in South Korea are explained by firm-specific factors such as 
size, growth rate and tangible assets. Cspedes et al. (2010) document that firms in Latin 
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America are similarly levered as firms in the USA despite the less developed nature of their 
capital markets. They attribute this puzzling observation to ownership concentration 
where firms resort to borrowings in a bid to avoid ceding control or dilution. Given such 
evidence from these studies, amongst others, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1) The increase in corporate debt is attributable to changes in firms- 
specific (demand-side) factors. 
 
Further, the extant literature reports that macroeconomic factors also have significant 
effects on capital structure. For example, Korajczyk and Levy (2003) present a model 
that predicts leverage to be pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical. Cook and Tang (2010) find 
that firms adjust capital structure towards a target faster in good macroeconomic envi- 
ronments. Also, Chen (2010) reports that economic growth rate, economic uncertainty, 
and business-cycle variations have a significant influence on corporate debt. Accordingly, 
our second hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) Changes in macroeconomic factors explain the dynamics in corpo- 
rate debt. 
 
Finally, the effects of supply-side factors are understudied relative to those of demand- 
side factors. Yet, prior studies have shown historical, institutional and legal factors 
which affect credit supply significantly influence firm financing policies. For example, 
Chen (2004) reports that immature and incomplete legal and institutional frameworks in 
China appear to be important determinants of capital structure as firm-specific factors. 
Similarly, Tchakoute Tchuigoua (2014) finds factors such as legal tradition, creditor rights 
and the stage of financial sector development significantly affect the capital structure of 
microfinance institutions. Beside these studies, the GFC has brought to the fore the 
importance of supply-side factors on credit supply and corporate financing decisions, 
which are pertinent conditions in emerging economies. Examining supply-side factors in 
emerging economies, however, is limited by data availability on variables such as credit, 
9  
credit lines and bond ratings. One way to deal with this challenge is to conduct event 
studies around credit supply shock events as forms of quasi-experiments. Several such 
studies report significant effects of supply-side factors on corporate financing decisions 
in the USA. For example, Flannery and Lockhart (2009) and Campello et al. (2011a,b) 
find that firms with credit lines fared better during the GFC than those without credit 
lines. Similarly, Leary (2009) reports a significant decrease in the supply of bank loans in 
the aftermath of the 1966 credit crunch. Using a similar approach, Lemmon and Roberts 
(2010) show that the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. and the subsequent 
regulatory changes in 1989 had significant adverse effects on the high-yield (junk) bond 
market. Motivated by evidence from this literature on the possible relevance of supply- 
side factors, we examine the changes in corporate debt in South Africa around the GFC, 
the Tech Bubble, and financial liberalisation events. We thus formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
 





To investigate factors affecting the evolution of corporate debt, we estimate several ver- 
sions of the following general model:- 
 
Dit =α + γTrend + βX it−1 + θZ it−1 +  it (1) 
 
where Dit is corporate debt (ratio of total debt to total assets) of firm i at time t ; Trend is 
a time trend; X it−1 is a vector of lagged firm-specific variables; Z it−1 is a vector of lagged 
macroeconomic variables; α, γ, β and θ are parameter coefficients to be estimated; and it 
is an error term. The lagged firm-specific variables in X it−1 are: Tobin’s q, research and 
development (R&D), size (Size), return on assets (ROA), property, plant, and equipment 
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(PPE), and non-debt tax shield (NDTS).4 The lagged macroeconomic variables in Z it−1 
are: foreign direct investment (FDI), gross domestic product growth (GDP Growth), 
interest spread (IR Spread), real interest rate (RealIR), inflation (Inflation), and the 
value of domestic bank credit to the private sector (Domestic Credit). All variables used 




Our data consists of annual accounting and macroeconomic variables and economic event 
dates. Accounting data is obtained from annual reports of publicly listed firms in South 
Africa drawn from Thomson Reuters Datastream and covers the period from 1990 to 
2015.5 The macroeconomic variables used are from The World-bank Database (WDI). 
As standard in the literature, we exclude firms in the regulated sectors (financials and 
utilities) and firms with missing data on key variables (total assets and sales).6 We set 
missing R&D observations to zero, and winsorise all firm-level variables used at the upper 
and bottom 1% to reduce the effects of spurious outliers. The final sample consists of 
8,632 firm-year observations on 775 firms. The sample is unbalanced due to the different 
entry and exit times of firms over the sample period. 
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the variables used. The mean (median)  
of total debt (TDA), long-term debt (LTDA), and short-term debt (STDA) is 15.2% 
(13.1%), 9.1% (5.9%) and 6.1% (4.3%), respectively. The high proportion of short-term 
debt (40%) is in line with Sorge et al. (2017) and reflects the high exposure of South 
4The firm-level determinants of corporate debt that we use are informed by the existing literature 
(Dang et al., 2012, 2014; Graham et al., 2015). 
5Appendix B presents the sample distribution over time and shows the evolution of corporate debt. 
6Appendix C presents the industrial composition for our sample.  The industries are classified based   
on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) - an industrial classification launched by Dow Jones and 
FTSE in 2005. The increase in corporate debt is pervasive and significant across all industries. 
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African firms (and, by example, firms in developing economies) to refinancing risk, as 
most of the short-term debt is in the form of bank loans. Of particular interest is the 
significant positive trend in TDA, LTDA, and STDA, which indicates a statistically sig- 
nificant increase over the sample period in the usage of debt financing by South African 
firms.7 These trends are consistent with the plots in Figure 2. The basic statistics for 
the determinants of leverage (Tobin’s q, R&D, Size, ROA, PPE, and NDTS) in Panel A 
are comparable to those in the literature. However, the trends of all the variables that 
should be positively associated with debt financing (i.e., Size, ROA and PPE) are nega- 
tive, whilst the trends of the variables that should be negatively associated with debt (i.e., 
Tobin’s q and NDTS) are positive. These trends predict that debt should be decreas- 
ing, which suggests a priori that demand-side factors (i.e., Tobin’s q, R&D, Size, ROA, 
PPE, and NDTS) are less likely to explain the upward trend in leverage shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
 
Table 2 presents corporate debt statistics on firms grouped by high or low levels of 
financial constraints. We use four proxies of financial constraints commonly used in the 
literature: age, size, tangibility, and the WW Index of Whited (2006). In each year, we 
partition firms into high and low groups based on whether they are above or below the 
average of each of the four proxies of financial constraints. This partitioning enables us 
to test whether binding financial constraints can explain the changes in leverage. The 
results, presented in Table 2, show that mature, large, high-tangibility and low-WW- 
Index firms have higher average levels of leverage than young, small, low-tangibility and 
high-WW-Index firms. These results are consistent with the literature on the effects of 
financial constraints on financial decisions and show that unconstrained firms have more 
access to debt financing relative to constrained firms (see Brown et al., 2009, 2012; Brown 
7The “Trend” in Table 1 is the estimated slope of a regression of the variable of interest (TDA, LTDA, 
and STDA) on a time trend. The dependent variable in these regressions is leverage (ratio to total assets 
of total debt (TDA), long-term debt (LTDA), or short-term debt (STDA)) and the independent variable 
is a time trend. 
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and Petersen, 2015). Comparisons of differences in the trends show positive values im- 
plying stronger trends for highly constrained firms. The statistical significance of this 
difference is mixed, but is clearer for long term debt. 
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
 
Table 3 presents the Spearman (above diagonal) and Pearson (below diagonal) pair- 
wise correlations between all the variables used. Total debt is positively correlated with 
size, NDTS, and PPE, and negatively correlated with Tobin’s q, R&D, and profitability. 
The correlations are in line with theory, except for NDTS which, apart from its correla- 
tion with size and PPE, appears to contradict the negative results reported in the USA 
(see Dang, 2013; Dang et al., 2014; Oztekin, 2015). This appears to suggest that NDTS 
has a positive effect on corporate debt in South Africa. 
 
5 Empirical results 
 
We start the discussion of the empirical results in Sub-sections 5.1 and 5.2 by examining 
whether traditional demand-side determinants explain the positive trend in corporate 
debt (TDA). We then investigate in Sub-section 5.3 the explanatory power of macroe- 
conomic factors. In the final Sub-section 5.4, we examine the explanatory power of 
supply-side factors. 
 
5.1 What are the effects of firm-specific factors on corporate debt? 
 
We estimate several variants of our baseline model of Equation (1). The results are sum- 
marised in Table 4. Column (1) presents the estimation results using the main traditional 
firm-specific determinants of corporate debt. Columns (2)–(6) present the estimation re- 
sults while including the time trend and dummy variables for period and year-of-listing. 
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
13  
 
In general, the results in Table 4 show that R&D, Size, PPE, and NDTS have a 
positive and significant (except R&D) effect on corporate debt, while Tobin’s q and 
profitability (ROA) have a negative effect. These results are generally consistent with 
theory except for NDTS, which turns out to be positive while theory predicts a negative 
effect on corporate debt because NDTS is a substitute for interest-tax shield. Since most 
of the coefficients of the determinants of corporate debt are of the expected sign, and 
for brevity, we do not discuss them further and shift our focus to the important trend 
variables. 
Column (2) presents estimation results of the model when the two dummy variables, 
Period2000−09 and Period2010−15, are included. This allows us to test whether firm-specific 
characteristics explain the increase in corporate debt over time. The coefficient estimates 
on these dummies are positive and significant, indicating that demand-side factors, rep- 
resented by the variables included in model (1), do not fully explain the evolution of cor- 
porate debt. A comparison of the coefficient on Period2000−09 with that on Period2010−15 
shows that the latter is significantly larger (the p-value of the Wald test is 0.019), which 
suggests that the increase in corporate debt is relatively higher in the latter period. 
Column (3) presents the estimation results of the model when only the time trend of 
corporate debt is included with a constant. The coefficient estimate on this time trend 
is positive and significant, which is consistent with the results in Table 1. The marginal 
effects of the model in Column (3) suggest that the average firm increases its use of cor- 
porate debt by 0.32% each year. Similarly, the coefficient of the time trend in Column 
(4) shows that the inclusion of the other determinants does not reduce the magnitude 
and significance of this trend by much, and the average firm increases debt financing by 
0.30% each year using the marginal effects. 
We next examine the effects of new listings on debt financing in Column (5) of Table 
4. We create three dummy variables based on the particular decade in which a firm 
first appears in the dataset (Listing1990−99,  Listing2000−09,  and Listing2010−15).  Column 
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(5) presents the estimation results when these listing dummies (less one, Listing1980−89) 
are included and the firm-specific variables excluded. The coefficient on the time trend 
remains positive and significant, and only the coefficient on Listing2010−15 is significant. 
The estimation in Column (6) adds the firm-specific variables as controls. The results 
on the time trend, the listing dummies, and the control variables are similar to those in 
Columns (4) and (5). This suggests that apart from a slight significance for the 2000–09 
decade, the vintage year of listing does not explain the upward trend in corporate debt. 
The coefficients on the firm-specific variables remain largely unchanged from Column (4), 
which shows that these variables may be important determinants of corporate debt even 
though they do not fully explain the rising debt financing levels in South Africa because 
the coefficient on the time trend remains consistently positive and significant across the 
different specifications.8 
Overall, the results in Table 4 show that the increase in corporate debt is persistent 
and firm-specific variables, though important (apart from R&D), do not fully explain this 
time trend. 
 
5.2 Do financial constraints matter? 
 
Having established that none of the main firm-specific variables used in the literature 
fully explains the time trend in corporate debt, we examine the variations in corporate 
debt across constrained and unconstrained firms. We classify a firm as highly (lowly) 
constrained if it is above (below) the average age, size, tangibility, or the WW Index. 
Table 5 presents the estimation results of Equation (1) with a time trend and firm-specific 
factors for the sub-groups based on the four measures of financial constraints. 
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
8Appendix C presents time trend coefficient estimates across industries from regressions of leverage 
ratios on a time trend variable. Garay et al. (2019), for example, find significant country and industry 
effects that if ignored lead to mispricing of corporate bonds (spreads) in emerging markets. Our results 
in Appendix C show a consistent positive and significant trend in all leverage ratios. This is inconsistent 
with Harris and Raviv (1991) as it shows that leverage ratios of South African firms vary significantly 
both across and within industries and over time. 
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The results show that the coefficient on the time trend remains consistently positive 
and significant across all the sub-samples that are based on age, size, tangibility and the 
WW Index. Thus, all firms have rising debt levels regardless of their age, size, or the 
degree of financial constraints. However, the magnitude of the coefficient estimates on 
the trend is smaller for firms with high financial constraints (young, small, low tangibility 
and high WW Index) than that for firms with low financial constraints. This suggests 
a lower rate of increase for constrained firms and is consistent with the consensus in 
the literature that binding financial constraints limit access to external financing (see 
Almeida et al., 2004; Whited, 2006; Brown et al., 2012; Dang et al., 2014). Comparisons 
of the trends in corporate debt (tabulated in columns entitled “Diff”), however, show 
results that are inconsistent with Hypothesis 1 (H1), since the difference in the trend 
coefficients between constrained and unconstrained firms is not statistically significant. 
This is in line with the results of the univariate analysis in Table 2. This suggests that 
the increase in corporate debt is pervasive and is not explained by differences in financial 
constraints. 
We conclude, therefore, that neither firm characteristics nor financial constraints ex- 
plain the increase in corporate debt that we document over the sample period. Hence, 
these findings do not support Hypothesis 1 (H1). 
 
5.3 Do macroeconomic factors matter? 
 
We extend the above analyses by examining the explanatory power of macroeconomic 
variables. We include foreign direct investment (FDI), value of traded stock (Stock 
Traded), GDP growth (GDP Growth), interest rate spread (IR Spread), real interest 
rate (RealIR), inflation (Inflation), and the value of domestic bank credit to the private 
sector (Domestic Credit) as further possible determinants of corporate debt. Our choice 
of these variables is motivated by Custdio et al. (2013) and Graham et al. (2015), among 
others, who find them significant. Table 5 presents the estimation results. 
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These show that FDI, Stock Traded, RealIR and Inflation have a significant posi- 
tive effect on corporate debt when each is examined separately with firm-specific factors 
included, while GDP Growth and IR Spread have a negative effect. Although all macroe- 
conomic variables are significant, except for Domestic Credit and the IR Spread, they 
only partially explain the increase in corporate debt (Hypothesis 2 - H2) as attested by 
the consistently significant and positive coefficient on the time trend (Trend×100) across 
the model specifications. This remains to be the case in the model of Column (8) that 
includes all firm-specific and macroeconomic variables. Worthy of note is the reduction 
in the magnitude of the trend coefficient when Stock Traded is included (Columns (2) 
and (8)), which points towards a partial explanatory power from stock markets. These 
results are consistent with Hypothesis 2 (H2) and with those reported in Table 4, but the 
time trend in corporate debt still persists. 
 
 
5.4 Do supply-side factors matter? 
 
We now examine the effects of supply-side factors (Hypothesis 3 - H3) using exogenous 
economic events that affect credit market conditions. We investigate changes in corporate 
debt around crises and financial liberalisation events, through pre and post-event periods. 
We consider financial liberalisation in relation to the end of apartheid in South Africa 
when the apartheid sanctions that had been put in place in 1961 were lifted in 1994, and 
the country was re-admitted into the global market in 1995. During the period 1961–1994 
the United Nations excluded South Africa from partaking in international unions, and 
economic and trade sanctions were imposed, effectively stifling the country’s economic 
growth and development (Vaughn and Ryan, 2006). We classify the period before 1995 as 
pre-liberalisation (see Chipeta et al., 2012; Andreasson, 2011), and we examine whether 
liberalisation explains the trend in corporate debt relative to the pre-liberalisation period. 
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For the analyses of crisis events, we restrict the sample periods to 4 years around the 
Tech-Bubble of 2000 and the GFC of 2008.9 Table 6 presents the estimation results of 
Equation (1) for the sub-periods. 
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Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 present the results for periods before and after the 
Tech-Bubble. The trend coefficient estimate changes from a significant 1.159 before the 
bubble to an insignificant -0.015 after the bubble. The switch in sign and decline in 
magnitude are clear evidence that the Tech-Bubble had a significant adverse effect on 
the time trend in debt financing. This suggests that firms in South Africa tend to use 
more debt when economic conditions are favourable, which is consistent with Cook and 
Tang (2010) who find that firms in the USA adjust capital structure relatively fast in 
good times, and with Dierker et al. (2013) who find that they do so to also manage risk. 
According to Gwatidzo and Ojah (2014), institutional problems such as high information 
asymmetry, weak creditor rights, and policy uncertainty tend to limit corporate financing 
choices. The increased use of debt financing prior to the Tech Bubble in South Africa 
further confirms the findings of Gwatidzo and Ojah (2014) and shows a high negative 
impact of economic downturns on debt financing in developing markets. 
The results in Columns (3) and (4) also show a significant decrease in corporate debt 
around the GFC, consistent with Hypothesis 3 (H3). This decrease, which follows a 
substantial economic and liquidity shock, is in line with the literature on the effects of 
the GFC on financing decisions in the USA (see Campello et al., 2011a,b; Kahle and 
Stulz, 2013; Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga, 2013) and suggests a significant 
role of supply-side factors in explaining the changes in corporate debt. 
Finally, the results in Columns (5) and (6) indicate a significant swing in the trend 
 
9Appendix D presents the results using alternative event dates ( 5 years) as these cannot be deter- 
mined precisely, especially since we use aggregate (annual) data. Our results using these alternative 
event dates remain qualitatively unchanged. We also find the results robust to moving the event dates 
one-year forward or backwards (not reported, but all results are available from the authors). 
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of corporate debt from negative to positive around financial liberalisation events. The 
significantly negative coefficient on the time trend prior to financial liberalisation reflects 
a substantial decrease in debt usage during the apartheid era of sanctions and economic 
isolation. The after-less-before difference in the trend coefficient is statistically significant, 
which is a clear indication that the re-introduction of South Africa to the global market 
post-apartheid explains why there was a marked increase in corporate debt financing 
relative to the pre-liberalisation apartheid era. These results support Hypothesis 3 (H3) 
and, overall, represent strong evidence that supply-side factors have a significant role to 




We conduct robustness checks to our main results using two different estimation tech- 
niques (fixed effects and Tobit regressions), alternative definitions of corporate debt, and 
sample dissection into sub-samples. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 present the estimation 
results of Equation (1) using Tobit regressions because the dependent variable, corporate 
debt, is bounded between zero and one. Columns (3) and (4), entitled FE, present estima- 
tion results using fixed effects that allow for fixed variations across firms and industries. 
Columns (5) and (6) present results using alternative definitions of corporate debt. Fi- 
nally, Columns (7)–(11) present results of a sensitivity analysis with sub-sampling and 
sub-period selections. 
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
 
The results using alternative estimations, namely Tobit and fixed effects, in Columns 
(1) and (2) and Columns and (3) and (4), respectively, show that the coefficients on the 
time trend and the period dummies (Period2000−09 and Period2010−15) are significant and 
that our results are robust to the choice of the estimation technique. Similarly, the results 
in Columns (5) and (6) using long-term and short-term debt as measures of corporate 
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debt show that the trend coefficient remains positive and significant, indicating that our 
results hold for these alternative definitions of corporate debt. 
Several studies report marked changes in the composition of listed firms, which may 
affect the observed evolution of dividends (see Fama and French, 2001), corporate invest- 
ments (see Brown and Petersen, 2009) and capital structure (see Custdio et al., 2013; 
Maes et al., 2019). In Columns (7) and (8), we test whether our results are sensitive to 
the changing composition of firms by focusing on balanced and unbalanced sub-samples. 
The coefficient on the time trend for the balanced sub-sample is higher than that for the 
unbalanced sub-sample. This implies that older firms increased debt more than younger 
firms and, more importantly, that our findings are robust to this type of sub-sampling 
concerns. 
Finally, we examine the sensitivity of our results to changes in firm characteristics 
by dividing the sample into three sub-periods: 1990–1999 (the 1990s), 2000–2009 (the 
2000s) and 2010–2015 (the 2010s). The results for these three ‘decades’, presented in 
Columns (9)–(11), are generally consistent in sign, magnitude and significance with our 
main results in Table 7. The trend coefficient increases from 0.198 in the 1990s, to 0.540 
in the 2000s, and to 0.852 in the 2010s. This confirms the increasing use of corporate 
debt over time. Coefficients on all the other traditional determinants of corporate debt 
maintain the same sign with only minor changes in significance across the three periods, 
and in a manner that is consistent with their inability to fully explain the evolution of 
corporate debt. 
Overall, the robustness tests suggest that changes in firm characteristics do not explain 
the trend in corporate debt but indicate the greater importance of supply-side factors in 
explaining corporate financing decisions. 
 
7 Discussion and concluding remarks 
 
This paper analyses the determinants of the pervasive increase in corporate debt in South 
Africa from 1990 to 2015. Beside being an emerging economy, South Africa is unique in 
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its history, financial and institutional structure, and development. Apartheid sanctions 
and the subsequent uplifting of these sanctions have had a substantial impact on the 
development of its debt and stock markets and, as shown in this paper, on the patterns 
of debt finance usage by firms. 
Our paper complements the growing academic literature on rising corporate debt 
and its determinants in emerging economies but is in contrast with the findings of prior 
research that tends to highlight demand-side and macroeconomic factors as more relevant 
than supply-side factors. Our results show that traditional demand-side factors, though 
important in the literature (Dang, 2011; Custdio et al., 2013; Graham et al., 2015), do 
not fully explain the rise in corporate debt, especially that most firm characteristics 
have changed in a direction contrary to that which would predict an increase in debt 
financing. This increase is partially explained by changing macroeconomic conditions, 
of which the development and growth of South Africa’ s capital market are particularly 
relevant. However, supply-side factors emerge as the most important determinants of the 
rising corporate debt in South Africa as our results suggest that collateral-based lending 
(tangible assets) is decreasing. 
 
7.1 Theoretical implications 
 
Our finding that corporate debt is rising against a backdrop of falling asset tangibility 
(collateral) indicates a shift away from traditional collateral-based lending. Decreases in 
collateral reduces debt capacity, which may limit future access to further financing. This 
contradicts the finding by Maes et al. (2019) of a strong link between pledgeable assets 
and access to short-term debt, especially for firms that are more exposed to ‘exporter’ risk 
(risk of serving distant export markets). The shift away from collateral lending implies 
a marked increase in bankruptcy costs as several properties of intangible capital such 
as irreversisbility, high asset substitution, high information asymmetry, low collateral 
values, long investment horizons and low chances of success (risky) pose unique chal- 
lenges for lenders or creditors. This finding corroborates earlier studies on the USA that 
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document a marked transition of economies towards intangible capital (see Brown and 
Petersen, 2009; Falato and Sim, 2014; Manikas et al., 2019). Because bankruptcy costs 
are markedly higher in developing economies (see Menkhoff et al., 2006; Ovtchinnikov, 
2010), the pronounced rise in corporate debt and the shift in corporate balance sheets 
that we document exacerbates bankruptcy concerns as firms are becoming systematically 
overlevered in a way that increases vulnerability to financial shocks. This finding chal- 
lenges traditional collateral-based theories as firms are increasingly accessing corporate 
debt against a background of shrinking collateral values and quality. In summary, our 
results lead us to question whether the long-established debt-collateral nexus is chang- 
ing, or a new one is emerging. Perhaps our study echoes calls for new corporate lending 
theories that emphasise the role of supply-side factors and intangible capital in accessing 
external financing. 
 
7.2 Practical implications 
 
Our findings also have several important practical implications. First, the rise in corpo- 
rate debt suggests at least a temporary boon for corporate debt investors in developing 
countries with likely changes in approaches to corporate financing policies. Our findings 
complement a discussion paper by the McKinsey Global Institute in June 2018 that doc- 
uments a 2.5 times increase in the global corporate bond market over the past decade 
(see Lund et al., 2018). This implies an increased availability of non-equity external fi- 
nancing that promotes economic growth, which is welcome news for managers, especially 
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis that had dampened both the supply and 
the appetite for debt financing. 
Second, the increase in corporate debt and the shrinking collateral values accentuate 
the call for practitioners to implement robust and more active strategies in managing 
financial risks, especially if they belong to exporting companies (Maes et al., 2019). The 
deterioration of the corporate quality coupled with the shift towards intangible capital, 
as this study shows, makes active management of capital structure more pertinent. 
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Third, as most debt financing in developing countries is in the form of short-term 
bank loans (see Sorge et al., 2017), the attendant maturity mismatches and refinancing 
risks require the adoption of more active financial management policies. 
Fourth, the increase in corporate debt that we document indicates an improvement in 
access to external financing, some of which could be channelled towards R&D. This could 
be beneficial in narrowing the technological gap between African and developed countries 
noted by You et al. (2019). Having said that, the increase in intangible assets coupled 
with the decrease in R&D (from 2004 onwards; see Appendix E) suggests that firms in 
South Africa are increasingly importing innovation rather than expending resources to 
generate new technology or innovation themselves (the caveat here obviously depends on 
whether resources channelled for innovation are expensed or capitalised, while R&D in our 
available dataset is an expensed amount). This finding is in line with You et al. (2019) 
who document a slow rate, or even a reversal, of technological convergence in Africa. 
Similarly, Seck (2015) argues that African countries will continue to lag behind other 
developed countries until they start producing innovation rather than continue to rely on 
the procurement or transfers of technology. This is also supported by George et al. (2016) 
who show that the marginal benefits of R&D are much higher in developing countries than 
in developed economies, which highlights the need to increase the allocation of resources 
into R&D, especially in Africa where it is lower than elsewhere. 
In general, our findings signal the need for managers to develop robust active strategies 
to manage the rising levels of debt given the implicit increase in bankruptcy risk in 
environments characterised by high or rising bankruptcy costs. This would be more 
pertinent during periods of heightened uncertainty about credit risk that is reminiscent 
of the run-up to the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007/2008. 
 
7.3 Limitations and future research 
 
Our study has certain caveats that also suggest directions for future research. First, we 
acknowledge that our findings relate to the analysis of a single country, which may or 
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may not be readily generalised to other emerging markets but represent a call to consider 
supply-side factors that may carry relevant implications to other emerging economies. 
Extending this supply-focused analysis to other emerging economies appears to be a 
promising endeavour for future research. Further, our results highlight the general need 
for researchers to investigate the importance of the often-overlooked supply-side factors as 
determinants of corporate debt given the global shift towards knowledge-based economies. 
We were also unable to control for bond characteristic due to the unavailability of bond 
data at firm-level in South Africa. This ought to be considered in future studies on 
emerging economies for which such data is available. Finally, we do not examine the 
implications of rising corporate debt on corporate policies, but our results suggest a call 
to investigate policies and practices such as dividend pay-out, retention of earnings, risk 
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Figure 1 Institutional context 
The figure plots (a) the Stock market capitalisation-to-GDP (Stock Market Cap) and (b) Private credit- 
to-GDP (Domestic Credit) over time. The variables are drawn from The World Bank Database. All 
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Figure 2 The evolution of leverage 
The figure plots the (a) mean and (b) median leverage (total debt (TDA), long-term debt (LTDA), and 
short-term debt (STDA)) over time. The sample consists of listed non-financial firms in South Africa 
drawn from Datastream and covers the period from 1990 to 2015. All variables used are defined in 
Appendix A, and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. 























































































Table 1 Basic statistics 
 
This table presents basic statistics and the ‘Trend’  for all variables used.  The ‘Trend’  is the slope of the regression of leverage (total debt (TDA), long-term           
debt (LTDA), and short-term debt (STDA)) on the trend  variable.  The  sample  consists  of  listed  non-financial  and  non-utility  firms  in  South  Africa  drawn 
from Datastream and covers the period from 1990 to 2015.  All variables used are defined in Appendix A, and are winsorised at the lower  and upper one  
percentiles. The asterisks ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
Panel A: All firms 
Trend 
Description N Firms Mean Stdev Min p25 p50 p75 Max  Mean Median  
TDA 8632 775 0.152 0.133 0.000 0.041 0.131 0.227 0.773  0.336*** 0.305***  
LTDA 775 775 0.091 0.107 0.000 0.009 0.059 0.132 0.771  0.204*** 0.155***  
STDA 8632 775 0.061 0.065 0.000 0.007 0.043 0.093 0.531  0.132*** 0.124***  
Tobin’s q 8632 775 1.635 0.896 0.246 1.033 1.371 2.001 9.951  1.020** 1.039***  
R&D 8632 775 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.063  -0.001 0.000  
Size 8043 775 15.357 1.678 9.852 14.220 15.531 16.512 19.221  -0.800 -0.639  
ROA 8043 775 0.199 0.107 0.004 0.133 0.182 0.243 0.982  -0.024 -0.041  
PPE 8043 775 0.376 0.238 0.008 0.175 0.334 0.571 0.978  -0.680*** -0.525***  
NDTS 8043 775 0.039 0.024 0.000 0.024 0.036 0.051 0.279  0.070*** 0.024***  
Panel B: Macroeconomic variables 
Variable N Mean Stdev Min p25 p50 p75 Max Trend  
FDI 8632 0.014 0.013 -0.001 0.004 0.010 0.022 0.060 0.058**  
Stock Traded 8632 0.465 0.237 0.054 0.280 0.517 0.700 0.861 2.970***  
GDP Growth 8632 0.027 0.020 -0.021 0.022 0.030 0.042 0.056 0.077  
IR Spread 8632 0.042 0.009 0.021 0.033 0.044 0.047 0.058 -0.041  
RealIR 8632 0.054 0.028 0.022 0.033 0.045 0.058 0.130 -0.149**  
Inflation 8632 0.069 0.031 0.014 0.050 0.059 0.086 0.153 -0.286***  














Table 2 Difference between firms 
This table presents the differences in mean,  median and standard deviation of corporate debt.  Firms are classified into two  groups based on whether the    
firm has below (Low) or above (High) average age, size, tangibility, and WW Index in each year. The ‘Trend’ is the slope of the regression of leverage (total 
debt (TDA), long-term debt (LTDA),  and short-term debt (STDA)) on the trend variable for each sub-sample.  The sample consists of listed non-financial   
and non-utility firms in South Africa drawn from Datastream and covers the period from 1990 to 2015. All variables used are defined in Appendix A, and 
are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. The asterisks ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
Financial    Low High Diff (High - Low) Trend 
Constraint Variables N Mean p50 Stdev Trend  N Mean p50 Stdev Trend  Mean p50 Stdev  Wald test  
 TDA 4,731 0.143 0.119 0.131 0.326***  3,901 0.163 0.143 0.134 0.352***  0.020*** 0.024*** 0.003  0.18  
Age LTDA 4,731 0.082 0.049 0.100 0.170***  3,901 0.101 0.072 0.113 0.251***  0.019*** 0.023*** 0.013***  2.33  
 STDA 4,731 0.060 0.038 0.071 0.155***  3,901 0.062 0.049 0.058 0.101***  0.002 0.011*** -0.013***  3.50*  
 TDA 4,358 0.131 0.103 0.125 0.181***  4,274 0.174 0.152 0.138 0.352***  0.043*** 0.049*** 0.013***  0.18  
Size LTDA 4,358 0.072 0.037 0.098 0.039  4,274 0.110 0.082 0.112 0.374***  0.038*** 0.045*** 0.014***  40.50***  
 STDA 4,358 0.059 0.035 0.068 0.145***  4,274 0.063 0.050 0.063 0.117***  0.004*** 0.015*** -0.005***  1.06  
 TDA 4,373 0.131 0.113 0.112 0.160***  4,259 0.174 0.152 0.149 0.519***  0.043*** 0.039*** 0.037***  39.52***  
Tangibility LTDA 4,373 0.065 0.042 0.077 0.042  4,259 0.117 0.089 0.125 0.374***  0.052*** 0.047*** 0.048***  48.51***  
 STDA 4,373 0.065 0.044 0.071 0.115*** 4,259 0.057 0.042 0.059 0.147*** -0.008*** -0.002 -0.012*** 0.98  
 TDA 4,365 0.166 0.147 0.134 0.470***  4,267 0.138 0.109 0.130 0.200***  -0.028*** -0.038*** -0.004**  18.93***  
WW Index LTDA 4,365 0.103 0.076 0.108 0.344***  4,267 0.078 0.040 0.103 0.062***  -0.025*** -0.036*** -0.005***  26.39***  



















Table 3 Correlation 
 
The table presents the pairwise correlations for all variables  used.  The  sample  consists  of  listed  non-financial  and  non-utility  firms  in  South  Africa  drawn 
from Datastream and covers the period from 1990 to 2015.  All variables used are defined in Appendix A, and are winsorised at the lower  and upper one  
percentiles. The asterisks ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
Variables TDA LTDA STDA Tobin’s q R&D Size ROA PPE NDTS 
TDA 1 0.853*** 0.765*** -0.188*** 0.167*** 0.178*** -0.129*** -0.055*** 0.299*** 
LTDA 0.865*** 1 0.412*** -0.158*** 0.090*** 0.240*** -0.125*** 0.035* 0.286*** 
STDA 0.605*** 0.131*** 1 -0.177*** 0.286*** 0.147*** -0.100*** -0.197*** 0.285*** 
Tobin’s q -0.134*** -0.113*** -0.077*** 1 -0.069*** -0.101*** 0.606*** -0.165*** 0.029 
R&D -0.003 -0.042** 0.064*** -0.066*** 1 0.370*** 0.016 -0.082*** 0.181*** 
Size 0.137*** 0.168*** 0.023 -0.085*** 0.103*** 1 -0.189*** 0.268*** -0.060*** 
ROA -0.155*** -0.149*** -0.062*** 0.586*** 0.007 -0.128*** 1 -0.119*** 0.282*** 
PPE 0.003 0.135*** -0.207*** -0.110*** -0.089*** 0.273*** -0.101*** 1 -0.102*** 





Table 4 The determinants of corporate debt 
 
The table presents the estimation results of  Equation  (1)  that  relates  corporate  debt  (total  debt-to-total  
assets (TDA)) to the ‘Trend’ and firm-specific variables. The sample consists of listed non-financial and non-
utility firms in South Africa drawn from Datastream and covers the period from 1990 to 2015. All variables 
used are defined in  Appendix  A,  and  are  winsorised  at  the  lower  and  upper  one  percentiles.  The 
asterisks ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 























  (0.010) (0.009) 
Listing2010−15  -0.017 -0.015 





 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 






























































 (0.042) (0.041) (0.010) (0.041) (0.010) (0.042) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes No No No No No 
N 8,043 8,043 8,632 8,043 8,632 8,043 































Table 5 Financial constraints and corporate debt 
 
The table presents the estimation results of Equation  (1)  that  relates  corporate  debt  (total  debt-to-total  assets  (TDA))  to  the  ‘Trend’  and  firm-specific  
variables. The sample consists of listed non-financial and non-utility  firms  in  South  Africa  drawn  from  Datastream  and  covers  the  period  from  1990  to 
2015.  All variables used are defined in Appendix A, and are winsorised at the lower  and upper one percentiles.  The asterisks  ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance         
at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
Age Size Tangibility WW Index 
    
Young Mature Diff Small Large Diff Low High Diff Low High Diff 
Variables (1)  (2) p-value  (3)  (4) p-value  (5)  (6) p-value  (7)  (8) p-value 
Trend    100 0.282*** 0.310*** 0.760 0.220*** 0.305*** 0.285 0.218*** 0.300*** 0.321 0.271*** 0.248*** 0.750 
(0.060) (0.071) (0.061) (0.059) (0.047) (0.069) (0.049) (0.064) 
Tobin’s q 0.002 -0.023*** 0.001 0.004 -0.014*** 0.001 -0.010*** -0.001 0.120 -0.010** -0.003 0.231 
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
R&D -0.310 0.848 0.318 -0.995** 3.507*** 0.000 -0.092 1.913 0.192 1.241 -1.045* 0.011 
(0.702) (0.952) (0.466) (1.111) (0.616) (1.465) (0.877) (0.617) 
Size 0.003 0.026*** 0.000 0.001 0.017*** 0.038 0.010*** 0.020*** 0.044 0.018*** 0.007* 0.044 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
ROA -0.143*** -0.023 0.035 -0.173*** -0.050 0.005 -0.084** -0.155*** 0.162 -0.068** -0.153*** 0.045 
(0.035) (0.045) (0.033) (0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.031) (0.037) 
PPE 0.084*** 0.151*** 0.226 0.083*** 0.138*** 0.181 0.028 0.158*** 0.019 0.127*** 0.087*** 0.231 
(0.024) (0.050) (0.029) (0.032) (0.042) (0.034) (0.028) (0.028) 
NDTS 0.607*** 0.505* 0.754 0.104 1.637*** 0.000 -0.158 1.130*** 0.000 1.615*** 0.160 0.000 
(0.176) (0.278) (0.162) (0.260) (0.171) (0.215) (0.221) (0.157) 
Constant -0.022 -0.387*** 0.000 0.052 -0.296*** 0.004 -0.011 -0.337*** 0.000 -0.303*** -0.036 0.002 
(0.054) (0.069) (0.058) (0.100) (0.052) (0.068) (0.065) (0.061) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No No No No No No No No 
N 4,249 3,794 3,948 4,095 4,027 4,016 4,151 3,892 






Table 6 The effects of macroeconomic factors on corporate debt 
 
The table presents the estimation results of Equation (1) that relates corporate debt (total debt-to-total assets  (TDA))  to  the  trend,  firm-specific  and  
macroeconomic variables.  The sample consists of listed non-financial and non-utility firms in South Africa drawn from  Datastream  and covers the period         
from 1990 to 2015. All variables used are defined in Appendix  A,  and  are  winsorised  at  the  lower  and  upper  one  percentiles.  The  asterisks  ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ 
indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 





























    (0.014) 
-0.243*** 
IR Spread 
  (0.079) 
-0.158 
   (0.070) 
0.096 
RealIR 
   (0.260) 
0.123* 
  (0.231) 
0.092 
Inflation 














 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
R&D 0.182 0.170 0.253 0.229 0.139 0.298 0.187 0.151 
 (0.645) (0.652) (0.650) (0.652) (0.651) (0.648) (0.643) (0.670) 
Size 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ROA -0.113*** -0.113*** -0.117*** -0.116*** -0.109*** -0.117*** -0.115*** -0.116*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
PPE 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.116*** 0.115*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
NDTS 0.674*** 0.688*** 0.701*** 0.679*** 0.669*** 0.702*** 0.628*** 0.680*** 
 (0.153) (0.153) (0.156) (0.155) (0.153) (0.156) (0.153) (0.158) 
Constant -0.173*** -0.173*** -0.159*** -0.160*** -0.181*** -0.186*** -0.188*** -0.165*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.045) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No No No No No No No No 
N 8,043 8,043 8,043 8,043 8,043 8,043 7,845 7,845 









Table 7 Supply-side factors and corporate debt 
 
This table presents the estimation results of Equation (1)  that  relates  corporate  debt  (total  debt-to-total  assets  (TDA))  to  the  ‘Trend’  and  firm-specific  
variables. The pre-crisis and crisis periods for the Tech-Bubble and Global Financial  Crisis  are  defined  as  4  years  around  the  years  2000  and  2008,  
respectively.  The ‘Before’ and ‘After’ periods are any periods before 1995 and after 1995 (the Liberalisation period), respectively.  The sample consists of           
listed non-financial and non-utility firms in South Africa drawn from Datastream  and covers the period from 1990 to 2015.  All variables used are defined              
in Appendix A, and are winsorised at the lower and upper one  percentiles.  The  asterisks  ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate  significance  at  the  one,  five,  and  ten  percent 
levels, respectively. 
Tech-Bubble Global Financial Crisis Liberalisation 
 Pre-crisis  Crisis  Diff  Pre-crisis  Crisis  Diff  Before  After  Diff  
Variables  (1)  (2)  p-value  (3)  (4)  p-value  (5)  (6)  p-value 




















































































































































































Table 8 Robustness 
 
The table presents the estimation results of Equation (1) that relates corporate debt  (total  debt-to-total  assets  (TDA),  long-term  debt-to-total  assets  
(LTDA)  and short- term debt-to-total assets (STDA)) to the trend and firm-specific variables.  The sample consists of listed non-financial and non-utility  
firms in South Africa drawn from Datastream  and covers the period from 1990 to 2015.  All variables used are defined in Appendix A, and are winsorised  
at the lower and upper one percentiles. The asterisks ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
 Tobit   FE       OLS  
             Sub-samples     
        Alternative Definitions  Balanced  Unbalanced 1990s 2000s  2010s  
  TDA TDA  TDA TDA  LTDA STDA  TDA  
 
TDA TDA TDA  TDA  
Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8) (9) (10)  (11)  
Trend×100   0.312*** 
(0.021) 


















 (0.004)  (0.010)  
Tobin’s q -0.007*** -0.010*** 0.010*** 0.006* -0.006*** -0.000 0.017 -0.005* -0.012** -0.005 -0.011 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) 
R&D 0.138 0.204 0.047 -0.076 -1.086*** 1.346** -3.428 -0.357 -2.000*** 1.656** -0.749 
 (0.364) (0.376) (0.279) (0.288) (0.349) (0.523) (2.641) (0.638) (0.507) (0.777) (2.022) 
Size 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.036*** 0.030*** 0.012*** 0.001 0.020* 0.008*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
ROA -0.163*** -0.142*** -0.105*** -0.077*** -0.081*** -0.030** -0.252 -0.114*** -0.268*** -0.120*** -0.044 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.013) (0.234) (0.026) (0.051) (0.034) (0.042) 
PPE 0.105*** 0.108*** 0.121*** 0.117*** 0.139*** -0.028*** 0.095** 0.102*** 0.000 0.154*** 0.214*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.027) (0.027) (0.019) (0.010) (0.036) (0.024) (0.026) (0.028) (0.042) 
NDTS 0.829*** 0.796*** 0.318*** 0.318*** 0.456*** 0.240*** -0.754 0.631*** 1.792*** 0.278 0.213 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.105) (0.107) (0.124) (0.062) (0.466) (0.149) (0.255) (0.188) (0.211) 
Constant -0.202*** -0.215*** -0.480*** -0.390*** -0.209*** 0.034 -0.123 -0.102** -0.095 -0.171*** -0.396*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.079) (0.082) (0.028) (0.022) (0.178) (0.045) (0.074) (0.046) (0.074) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No No No No No No No No No No No 
N 8,043 8,043 8,043 8,043 8,043 8,043 1,144 6,899 2,318 3,680 2,045 
R2   0.11 0.11 0.21 0.10 0.43 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.25 




Period2000−09 0.033*** 0.030*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) 
Period2010−15 0.044*** 0.027*** 
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− × × − × 
Assets Assets 
Appendix A Variable definitions 
The table below lists the definitions of all variables used. All firm-level variables are drawn from Thomson 
Datastream and macroeconomic variables are from The World Bank. The sample consists of listed non- 





TDA Total debt to total assets (Corporate debt). 
LTDA Long-term debt to total assets. 
STDA Short-term debt to total assets. 
Trend The time trend. 
Listing1990−99 Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms that were first listed 
between 1990 to 1999 and otherwise, zero. 
Listing2000−09 Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms that were first listed 
between 2000 to 2009 and otherwise, zero. 
Listing2010−15 Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms that were first listed 
between 2010 to 2015 and otherwise, zero. 
Period1990−99 Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the period from 1990 to 1999 
and otherwise, zero. 
Period2000−09 Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the period from 2000 to 2000 
and otherwise, zero. 
Period2010−15 Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the period from 2011 to 2015 
and otherwise, zero. 
Tobin’s q Market-to-book ratio. 
R&D Research and development to total assets. 
Size Logarithm of total assets. 
ROA Earnings before interest and tax plus depreciation to total assets. 
PPE Property, plant and equipment to total assets. 
NDTS Depreciation to total assets. 
Age The difference between the year when a firm first appears in the 
database and current year. 
WW Index −0.091 × Cash Flow − 0.062 × DivDummy + 0.021 × Total debt 
0.044 Size + 0.102 IndustrySalesGrowth 0.035 SalesGrowth 
The WW Index is based on Whited (2006). 
FDI Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP). 
Stock Traded Stocks traded, total value (% of GDP). 
GDP Growth GDP growth (annual %). 
IR Spread Interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate %). 
RealIR Real interest rate (%). 
Inflation Inflation, consumer prices (annual %). 
Domestic Credit Domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP). 
Stock Market Cap Stock market capitalisation to GDP (% of GDP). 
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Appendix B The time-series variation in leverage 
 
The table presents the mean and median for leverage (total debt (TDA), long-term debt (LTDA), and short-
term debt (STDA)) in each year.  The ‘Trend’  is the slope of the regression of the leverage ratio      on the 
trend variable. The sample consists of listed non-financial and non-utility firms in South Africa drawn 
from Datastream and covers the period from 1990 to 2015. All variables used are defined in Appendix A, 
and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. The asterisks ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at 
































Trend× 100 0.336*** 0.204*** 0.132*** 0.305*** 0.155*** 0.124*** 
 
 Mean   Median  Mean Median  
Year/Decades TDA LTDA STDA TDA LTDA STDA LTDA-STDA LTDA-STDA 
1990 0.111 0.068 0.043 0.107 0.054 0.031 0.025*** 0.023***  
1991 0.117 0.070 0.046 0.120 0.052 0.033 0.024*** 0.019***  
1992 0.110 0.068 0.042 0.091 0.046 0.035 0.026*** 0.011***  
1993 0.114 0.073 0.040 0.105 0.052 0.029 0.033*** 0.023***  
1994 0.124 0.077 0.047 0.100 0.043 0.036 0.030*** 0.007***  
1995 0.118 0.076 0.042 0.085 0.039 0.028 0.034*** 0.011***  
1996 0.117 0.077 0.039 0.096 0.045 0.024 0.038*** 0.021***  
1997 0.131 0.086 0.044 0.098 0.057 0.025 0.042*** 0.032***  
1998 0.139 0.089 0.049 0.120 0.063 0.029 0.040*** 0.034***  
1999 0.153 0.091 0.060 0.141 0.068 0.032 0.031*** 0.036***  
2000 0.143 0.079 0.064 0.117 0.049 0.045 0.015*** 0.004***  
2001 0.152 0.079 0.073 0.131 0.052 0.047 0.006 0.005  
2002 0.145 0.081 0.063 0.122 0.055 0.040 0.018*** 0.015*  
2003 0.152 0.084 0.068 0.141 0.046 0.049 0.016*** -0.003***  
2004 0.147 0.080 0.068 0.136 0.058 0.048 0.012** 0.010***  
2005 0.138 0.073 0.063 0.124 0.049 0.048 0.010** 0.001***  
2006 0.152 0.088 0.064 0.136 0.057 0.051 0.024*** 0.006***  
2007 0.160 0.086 0.075 0.126 0.053 0.051 0.011* 0.002  
2008 0.177 0.100 0.077 0.150 0.058 0.061 0.023*** -0.003***  
2009 0.185 0.117 0.067 0.155 0.067 0.050 0.050*** 0.017***  
2010 0.166 0.105 0.059 0.133 0.073 0.044 0.046*** 0.029***  
2011 0.163 0.098 0.063 0.139 0.062 0.054 0.035*** 0.008***  
2012 0.166 0.103 0.062 0.137 0.063 0.046 0.041*** 0.017***  
2013 0.189 0.114 0.074 0.185 0.087 0.059 0.040*** 0.028***  
2014 0.196 0.127 0.069 0.181 0.102 0.053 0.058*** 0.049***  
2015 0.210 0.138 0.072 0.192 0.107 0.058 0.066*** 0.049***  
1990s 0.126 0.079 0.046 0.106 0.053 0.031 0.033*** 0.022***  
2000s 0.156 0.087 0.068 0.136 0.054 0.049 0.019*** 0.005***  
2010s 0.178 0.112 0.066 0.158 0.076 0.053 0.046*** 0.023***  








Appendix C The changes in corporate debt across industries 
 
The  table  presents  summary  statistics  and  the  ‘Trend’  of  total  debt  (TDA),  long-term  debt  (LTDA),  and  short-term  debt  (STDA)  by  industry.  The  
Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), a taxonomy launched by Dow Jones and FTSE in  2005,  is  used  to  classify  firms  into  seven  industries:  Basic  
Materials (BM), Consumer Goods (CG), Consumer  Services  (CS),  Health  Care  (HC),  Industrials  (IND),  Technology  (TECH)  and  Telecommunications  
(TELC). The ‘Trend’ is the slope of the regression  of  the  leverage  ratio  on  the  trend  variable.  The  sample  consists  of  listed  non-financial  and  non-utility 
firms in South Africa drawn from Datastream  and covers the period from 1990 to 2015. All variables used are defined in Appendix A, and are winsorised              
at the lower and upper one percentiles. The asterisks ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
Variables  ICB Code 1000 3000 5000 4000 2000 9000 6000  
  ICB Indus- BM CG CS HC IND TECH TELC ALL 
  try         
  N 2,933 1,028 1,654 187 2,496 403 178 8,879 
  Firms 274 84 129 26 218 39 19 789 
  Proportion 33.0% 11.6% 18.6% 2.1% 28.1% 4.5% 2.0% 100.0% 
  Mean 0.141 0.149 0.129 0.312 0.187 0.114 0.173 0.156 
  Median 0.112 0.130 0.101 0.295 0.170 0.088 0.190 0.131 
TDA  Stdev 0.136 0.116 0.124 0.178 0.139 0.112 0.107 0.136 
  Mean 0.134*** 0.146*** 0.124*** 0.290*** 0.187*** 0.085*** 0.186*** 0.152*** 
 Trend Median 0.108*** 0.133*** 0.089*** 0.248*** 0.175*** 0.054*** 0.198*** 0.131*** 
  Mean 0.092 0.070 0.083 0.199 0.102 0.051 0.121 0.091 
  Median 0.063 0.045 0.049 0.160 0.071 0.015 0.134 0.059 
LTDA  Stdev 0.112 0.077 0.099 0.184 0.112 0.072 0.081 0.108 
  Mean 0.087*** 0.073*** 0.078*** 0.197*** 0.105*** 0.040*** 0.136*** 0.091*** 
 Trend Median 0.059*** 0.050*** 0.044*** 0.143*** 0.075*** 0.014*** 0.140*** 0.060*** 
  Mean 0.049 0.078 0.046 0.113 0.084 0.061 0.052 0.064 
  Median 0.026 0.060 0.021 0.061 0.068 0.027 0.060 0.042 
STDA  Stdev 0.066 0.076 0.060 0.121 0.076 0.077 0.036 0.073 
  Mean 0.046*** 0.071*** 0.047*** 0.093*** 0.081*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.061*** 










Appendix D The impact of supply-side factors on corporate debt 
 
The table presents the estimation results of Equation  (1)  that  relates  corporate  debt  (total  debt-to-total  assets  (TDA))  to  the  ‘Trend’  and  firm-specific  
variables. The Tech-Bubble, Global Financial Crisis and  liberalisation  periods  are  defined  as  5  years  around  the  years  2000,  2008  and  1995,  respectively. 
The sample consists of listed non-financial and non-utility firms in South Africa drawn from Datastream  and  covers  the  period  from  1990  to  2015.  All 
variables used are defined in Appendix A, and are winsorised at the lower  and upper one percentiles.  The asterisks  ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the             
one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
Tech-Bubble Global Financial Crisis Liberalisation 
 Pre-crisis  Crisis  Diff  Pre-crisis  Crisis  Diff  Before  After  Diff  
Variables  (1)  (2)  p-value  (3)  (4)  p-value  (5)  (6)  p-value 























































































































































































Appendix E The time-series variation of firm-specific factors 
 
The sample consists of listed non-financial and non-utility firms in South Africa drawn from Datastream and covers the period from 1990 to 2015. All 
variables used are defined in Appendix A, and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. 
Panel A: Mean 
Year N New Firms TDA LTDA STDA Tobin’s q R&D×103  Size ROA PPE NDTS INTANG 
1990 198 198 0.111 0.068 0.043 1.685 0.679 15.700 0.266 0.485 0.028 0.076 
1991 207 9 0.117 0.070 0.046 1.497 0.604 15.800 0.230 0.482 0.028 0.072 
1992 217 10 0.110 0.068 0.042 1.512 0.813 15.700 0.207 0.483 0.030 0.075 
1993 232 15 0.114 0.073 0.040 1.435 0.837 15.700 0.184 0.482 0.030 0.072 
1994 251 19 0.124 0.077 0.047 1.605 0.856 15.600 0.176 0.487 0.031 0.083 
1995 245 8 0.118 0.076 0.042 1.792 0.926 15.600 0.176 0.473 0.029 0.081 
1996 262 28 0.117 0.077 0.039 1.652 1.169 15.600 0.181 0.452 0.029 0.085 
1997 269 23 0.131 0.086 0.044 1.713 1.921 15.600 0.171 0.433 0.029 0.091 
1998 335 87 0.139 0.089 0.049 1.622 2.022 15.500 0.162 0.428 0.031 0.109 
1999 359 46 0.153 0.091 0.060 1.439 2.367 15.100 0.174 0.391 0.037 0.077 
2000 363 26 0.143 0.079 0.064 1.441 1.002 15.000 0.178 0.412 0.039 0.106 
2001 355 37 0.152 0.079 0.073 1.539 1.410 14.900 0.201 0.364 0.041 0.134 
2002 368 27 0.145 0.081 0.063 1.347 1.540 14.900 0.199 0.319 0.041 0.129 
2003 387 38 0.152 0.084 0.068 1.331 1.693 15.000 0.204 0.321 0.044 0.120 
2004 396 23 0.147 0.080 0.068 1.332 1.955 15.000 0.210 0.343 0.049 0.131 
2005 410 29 0.138 0.073 0.063 1.462 1.384 15.100 0.203 0.335 0.048 0.137 
2006 421 27 0.152 0.088 0.064 1.774 1.098 15.100 0.230 0.326 0.045 0.162 
2007 421 27 0.160 0.086 0.075 2.044 0.995 15.300 0.222 0.330 0.038 0.164 
2008 434 39 0.177 0.100 0.077 2.234 1.048 15.400 0.236 0.329 0.036 0.181 
2009 407 9 0.185 0.117 0.067 1.674 0.874 15.400 0.222 0.318 0.034 0.189 
2010 432 40 0.166 0.105 0.059 1.492 0.985 15.500 0.192 0.340 0.038 0.176 
2011 413 10 0.163 0.098 0.063 1.614 0.847 15.500 0.199 0.361 0.043 0.179 
2012 373 0 0.166 0.103 0.062 1.662 0.811 15.400 0.194 0.346 0.042 0.173 
2013 329 0 0.189 0.114 0.074 1.782 0.810 15.500 0.188 0.359 0.043 0.175 
2014 299 0 0.196 0.127 0.069 1.821 0.623 15.700 0.176 0.372 0.046 0.194 
2015 249 0 0.210 0.138 0.072 1.889 0.368 15.700 0.178 0.351 0.047 0.216 
1990–1999 2,575 443 0.126 0.079 0.046 1.592 1.298 15.600 0.189 0.456 0.031 0.083 
2000–2009 3,962 282 0.156 0.087 0.068 1.632 1.289 15.100 0.212 0.339 0.042 0.146 
2010–2015 2,095 50 0.178 0.112 0.066 1.690 0.770 15.500 0.189 0.354 0.043 0.183 
 











Appendix E The time-series variation of firm-specific factors (continued) 
 
Panel B: Median 
Year N New Firms TDA LTDA STDA Tobin’s q R&D×103  Size ROA PPE NDTS INTANG 
1990 198 198 0.107 0.054 0.031 1.386 0.000 15.900 0.228 0.431 0.031 0.059 
1991 207 9 0.120 0.052 0.033 1.148 0.000 16.000 0.208 0.430 0.032 0.051 
1992 217 10 0.091 0.046 0.035 1.197 0.000 15.800 0.192 0.407 0.033 0.046 
1993 232 15 0.105 0.052 0.029 1.121 0.000 15.700 0.179 0.427 0.032 0.037 
1994 251 19 0.100 0.043 0.036 1.324 0.000 15.800 0.160 0.431 0.032 0.041 
1995 245 8 0.085 0.039 0.028 1.496 0.000 15.800 0.159 0.450 0.033 0.046 
1996 262 28 0.096 0.045 0.024 1.438 0.000 15.800 0.154 0.381 0.030 0.048 
1997 269 23 0.098 0.057 0.025 1.435 0.000 15.700 0.161 0.338 0.030 0.055 
1998 335 87 0.120 0.063 0.029 1.422 0.000 15.700 0.161 0.358 0.031 0.061 
1999 359 46 0.141 0.068 0.032 1.093 0.000 15.400 0.164 0.332 0.036 0.041 
2000 363 26 0.117 0.049 0.045 1.181 0.000 15.200 0.171 0.363 0.037 0.055 
2001 355 37 0.131 0.052 0.047 1.300 0.000 15.100 0.184 0.318 0.042 0.097 
2002 368 27 0.122 0.055 0.040 1.171 0.000 15.000 0.176 0.249 0.040 0.082 
2003 387 38 0.141 0.046 0.049 1.149 0.000 15.100 0.184 0.271 0.042 0.073 
2004 396 23 0.136 0.058 0.048 1.177 0.000 15.200 0.205 0.288 0.047 0.095 
2005 410 29 0.124 0.049 0.048 1.409 0.000 15.300 0.197 0.283 0.044 0.091 
2006 421 27 0.136 0.057 0.051 1.561 0.000 15.300 0.210 0.281 0.039 0.119 
2007 421 27 0.126 0.053 0.051 1.755 0.000 15.500 0.203 0.272 0.033 0.119 
2008 434 39 0.150 0.058 0.061 1.929 0.000 15.600 0.206 0.313 0.030 0.137 
2009 407 9 0.155 0.067 0.050 1.482 0.000 15.600 0.206 0.283 0.030 0.144 
2010 432 40 0.133 0.073 0.044 1.290 0.000 15.600 0.174 0.290 0.036 0.130 
2011 413 10 0.139 0.062 0.054 1.411 0.000 15.600 0.166 0.357 0.037 0.123 
2012 373 0 0.137 0.063 0.046 1.318 0.000 15.500 0.169 0.316 0.036 0.110 
2013 329 0 0.185 0.087 0.059 1.393 0.000 15.600 0.169 0.330 0.037 0.121 
2014 299 0 0.181 0.102 0.053 1.466 0.000 15.900 0.152 0.335 0.039 0.144 
2015 249 0 0.192 0.107 0.058 1.538 0.000 16.000 0.161 0.326 0.038 0.177 
1990–1999 2,575 443 0.106 0.053 0.031 1.293 0.000 15.700 0.175 0.405 0.032 0.049 
2000–2009 3,962 282 0.136 0.054 0.049 1.416 0.000 15.300 0.193 0.291 0.039 0.103 
2010–2015 2,095 50 0.158 0.076 0.053 1.370 0.000 15.600 0.167 0.326 0.037 0.130 
 
Total 8632 775 0.131 0.059 0.043 1.371 0.000 15.500 0.182 0.334 0.036 0.093 
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